Imperative Exchange: Difference between revisions

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[[Imperative]] Exchange is a concept Katz derived from Gans’s analysis of early human culture, in its imperative and preliminary [[declarative]] stage, in The End of Culture. The first relation of the human group to the sacred [[center]] is [[ostensive]], with the emergence of rituals iterating the originary event. The emergence of the imperative generates a new stage in human culture: beyond just “pointing” to the center, members of the group can issue imperatives to the center. These imperatives would not be commands, but supplications and requests—what we call “prayers.” The human group is always involved in some kind of exchange with the central object: at the ostensive stage, the human group “honors” the sacred center and, in return, is granted its very existence. So, if the group is now issuing imperatives to the center, it must also be hearing imperatives from it. Like any exchange, it has the form of do ut des: I give so that you may give. It is simultaneously a gift exchange—gifts are what are being requested and commanded. This is the logic of sacrifice. I apply this concept more generally to the structure of all imperatives.  
[[Imperative]] Exchange is a concept Katz derived from Gans’s analysis of early human culture, in its imperative and preliminary [[declarative]] stage, in The End of Culture. The first relation of the human group to the sacred [[center]] is [[ostensive]], with the emergence of rituals iterating the originary event. The emergence of the imperative generates a new stage in human culture: beyond just “pointing” to the center, members of the group can issue imperatives to the center. These imperatives would not be commands, but supplications and requests—what we call “prayers.” The human group is always involved in some kind of exchange with the central object: at the ostensive stage, the human group “honors” the sacred center and, in return, is granted its very existence. So, if the group is now issuing imperatives to the center, it must also be hearing imperatives from it. Like any exchange, it has the form of do ut des: I give so that you may give. It is simultaneously a gift exchange—gifts are what are being requested and commanded. This is the logic of sacrifice. I apply this concept more generally to the structure of all imperatives.  


IIf some individual “does what he is supposed to,” that is, follows social imperatives, in exchange he expects the social order to at least protect him from certain harms. This is the structure of our mimetic relation to “reality.” The concept of “imperative exchange” also provides us with a way of specifying the relation between declaratives and imperatives. On the most basic level, declaratives “explain” the failures of imperative exchanges. If I did what the sacred being at the center commanded, but my hunt nevertheless was fruitless, this must be accounted for: perhaps I did what was commanded, but not with the right “intention.” Perhaps some opponent of the sacred being interfered with its intention. We can see the origin of mythology here. Similarly, a modern individual who has “played by the rules” but has nevertheless had his expectations of a good life frustrated will find narratives and analyses that invent agencies responsible for this discrepancy.
If some individual “does what he is supposed to,” that is, follows social imperatives, in exchange he expects the social order to at least protect him from certain harms. This is the structure of our mimetic relation to “reality.” The concept of “imperative exchange” also provides us with a way of specifying the relation between declaratives and imperatives. On the most basic level, declaratives “explain” the failures of imperative exchanges. If I did what the sacred being at the center commanded, but my hunt nevertheless was fruitless, this must be accounted for: perhaps I did what was commanded, but not with the right “intention.” Perhaps some opponent of the sacred being interfered with its intention. We can see the origin of mythology here. Similarly, a modern individual who has “played by the rules” but has nevertheless had his expectations of a good life frustrated will find narratives and analyses that invent agencies responsible for this discrepancy.

Revision as of 06:08, 14 March 2023

Imperative Exchange is a concept Katz derived from Gans’s analysis of early human culture, in its imperative and preliminary declarative stage, in The End of Culture. The first relation of the human group to the sacred center is ostensive, with the emergence of rituals iterating the originary event. The emergence of the imperative generates a new stage in human culture: beyond just “pointing” to the center, members of the group can issue imperatives to the center. These imperatives would not be commands, but supplications and requests—what we call “prayers.” The human group is always involved in some kind of exchange with the central object: at the ostensive stage, the human group “honors” the sacred center and, in return, is granted its very existence. So, if the group is now issuing imperatives to the center, it must also be hearing imperatives from it. Like any exchange, it has the form of do ut des: I give so that you may give. It is simultaneously a gift exchange—gifts are what are being requested and commanded. This is the logic of sacrifice. I apply this concept more generally to the structure of all imperatives.

If some individual “does what he is supposed to,” that is, follows social imperatives, in exchange he expects the social order to at least protect him from certain harms. This is the structure of our mimetic relation to “reality.” The concept of “imperative exchange” also provides us with a way of specifying the relation between declaratives and imperatives. On the most basic level, declaratives “explain” the failures of imperative exchanges. If I did what the sacred being at the center commanded, but my hunt nevertheless was fruitless, this must be accounted for: perhaps I did what was commanded, but not with the right “intention.” Perhaps some opponent of the sacred being interfered with its intention. We can see the origin of mythology here. Similarly, a modern individual who has “played by the rules” but has nevertheless had his expectations of a good life frustrated will find narratives and analyses that invent agencies responsible for this discrepancy.